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The UK’s foreign and security policy: what’s at stake in the 
referendum? 
Richard Whitman 
Foreign and security policy was not an 
area in which Prime Minister Cameron 
sought to alter the relationship between 
the UK and the European Union (EU) in 
renegotiating the terms of Britain’s 
membership. However, security has 
become a key theme in the referendum 
debate. The airport and metro bombings 
in Brussels have focused particular 
attention on the issue of border and 
‘homeland’ security, and whether the UK 
has its security enhanced, or 
compromised, through its membership 
of the EU.  There are also broader 
questions about the EU’s historic role in 
bringing peace to the European 
continent and its capacity to be a 
capable security and defence actor. 
These were raised by David Cameron in 
what was the most passionate speech on 
Europe of his Premiership delivered on 
9th May. 
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in the Referendum on 23rd June.1 His 
argument was that the UK‟s and the EU‟s 
security are intertwined in that „…there is a 
close relationship between the security and 
prosperity of the continent to which our island 
is tied geographically and our own security and 
prosperity.‟  
 
Cameron‟s claims have been echoed by key 
international figures, including President 
Obama, Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary 
General, and heads of government from 
Commonwealth countries allowing remain 
campaigners to highlight how a Brexit might 
undermine other relationships central to UK 
national security. The more general concern 
expressed is that a Brexit would add to a 
lengthening list of crisis for the EU to address 
including the existing migration crisis, which 
has triggered a partial roll back of Schengen 
free movement area, and to Europe‟s current 
economic difficulties. Further, it might then 
also act as the catalyst for the European 
integration project to unravel, and thus create 
a more general European security crisis.  
 
For Brexit campaigners, an exit from the EU 
would allow the UK greater freedom of choice 
to fully utilise its diplomatic and military 
capabilities alongside its soft power, its 
position as an unrivalled international financial 
centre and its memberships of the 
Anglosphere and the Commonwealth to seek 
new international influence, especially with 
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The argument that the EU is a „net 
contributor‟ to the UK‟s national security is a 
key campaign theme of David Cameron and by 
„remain‟ campaigners. The Prime Minister has 
been especially keen to make a connection in 
the public mind between EU membership and 
national security in his speeches and 
statements making the case for a Remain vote 
 2 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
rising powers. Brexit campaigners have sought 
to downplay the EU‟s security role by making 
the argument that it is NATO and the United 
States, not the EU, that have kept the peace in 
Europe since the Second World War. These 
campaigners also argue that EU defence policy 
has the ambition to create a „Euro army‟ to 
replace national militaries. 
 
These competing claims of the Remain and 
the Brexit campaigners are broad and difficult 
to verify as they deal in hypotheticals rather 
than claims that can be tested against available 
evidence. This paper focuses on the current 
foreign and defence policy relationship as it is 
organised between the UK and the EU.  It 
argues that, on the basis of the existing EU 
policy arrangements, foreign and security 
policy is an area in which the impact of a vote 
to leave the EU might be relatively marginal in 
contrast to other aspects of the UK‟s EU 
relationship, such as those upon Britain‟s 
economy. This is because existing EU member 
state cooperation in this area is 
intergovernmental, disentangling the UK from 
EU institutions and policies would be 
relatively straightforward. It is also an area in 
which EU policy achievement has been 
modest. Further, it is an area in which the 
costs of a Brexit might fall more heavily on the 
EU than the UK, as the loss of a member state 
with significant diplomatic and military 
resources would diminish the collective 
capabilities at the disposal of EU foreign and 
defence policies. 
 
THE STATE-OF-PLAY IN THE UK-EU 
FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 
RELATIONSHIP 
 
The UK is, alongside France, one of the 
European Union‟s two most powerful and 
ambitious states when it comes to foreign and 
security policies. The UK remains a globally 
significant state as a permanent UN Security 
Council member, recognised nuclear weapons 
state and a leading member of NATO and the 
Commonwealth. Its Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) sees it economy ranked 5th globally,2 
with the sixth highest defence budget in the  
 world,
3 and the UK hosts a major defence 
industry which makes the UK the 6th largest 
arms exporter.4 The UK also maintains 
substantial diplomatic, military and intelligence 
capabilities which would allow it to continue to 
pursue a separate national foreign, security and 
defence policy, in the case of either a „Leave‟ 
or „Remain‟ outcome in the June referendum. 
Whether the UK‟s international influence 
would be as significant outside the EU is a key 
issue of significance in determining the impact 
of any referendum vote to end membership.  
 
FOREIGN POLICY 
The UK‟s current foreign and security policy - 
which extends to its trade and development 
policies - are embedded within, and pursued 
through, the EU. The UK has used its 
membership of the EU to enhance its 
international influence and as a vehicle for 
leveraging and amplifying national foreign and 
security policy objectives. The EU‟s 
mechanisms for foreign policy have provided 
the UK with the best of both worlds – 
allowing the UK freedom of action to act 
independently where it chooses and to act 
collaboratively and leverage common resources 
where it prefers. This allows the UK to have a 
greater influence in world affairs than it could 
wield if acting purely on its own. The EU 
mechanisms are also particularly attractive for 
a large Member State like the UK with 
historical engagements and widespread 
commercial interests around the world. A large 
Member State like the UK has a greater ability 
to influence EU policy on a wide range of 
issues as it has a more extensive and ambitious 
foreign and security policy than the majority of 
the EU‟s smaller and medium sized Member 
States. 
 
The Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) and the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) have allowed the UK 
to preserve national independence in its 
diplomacy whilst allowing for the coordination 
of policy where interests are held in common 
with the EU‟s other member states. This is 
already an area in which the UK has been able 
to preserve autonomy largely uncomplicated by 
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binding EU policy commitments that intrude 
significantly on national foreign, security and 
defence policy.  
 
Within the UK the CFSP‟s achievements to-
date are presented as being rather modest and 
mixed.5 The EU‟s participation in the Iran 
nuclear diplomacy process and brokering 
agreement between the Kosovan and Serbian 
Governments to normalise their relations are 
presented as successes. The collective 
sanctions regime against Russia for its 
invasions of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, 
despite considerable differences of view 
between member states, is presented as a 
success. However, it should be noted that 
prominent Brexiteers such as Boris Johnson 
and Nigel Farage have pictured Russia‟s 
invasions as the direct consequence of a 
misguided Eastern Partnership policy.  
 
The UK government has been consistently 
resistant to any moves to restrict national 
autonomy in foreign policy making. It has been 
interested in reforms to EU foreign policy that 
would increase its visibility and coherence but 
has not accepted the proposition that member 
states should converge on a „single‟ foreign 
policy that would replace those of the member 
states.  
 
DEFENCE AND SECURITY 
For the UK the EU‟s CSDP focus on 
preventing, managing and resolving conflict 
using both military and civilian resources has 
been a policy focus with which recent 
governments have been comfortable. CSDP 
roles such as providing peace keeping forces, 
providing security for elections to take place in 
states in conflict, training police, armed forces 
and security personnel in third countries, and 
monitoring disputed borders, ceasefires and 
peace agreements all fit with the UK‟s 
advocacy of the „comprehensive approach‟ to 
conflict management. The UK has also been 
comfortable with keeping these missions small 
scale, and with the majority in the Western 
Balkans and Sub-Saharan Africa providing the 
opportunity for NATO to focus its energies 
elsewhere.  
 
The UK can lay claim to a leading role in kick-
starting the CSDP at the 1998 Anglo-French 
summit in St-Malo, where Tony Blair and 
Jacques Chirac agreed to a push for greater EU 
defence capabilities. Subsequently, and despite 
its position as one of the EU‟s two militarily 
most significant member states, the UK has 
not sought to play a leading role in the 
development of a European Union defence 
policy.  
 
Britain has treated the CSDP as an optional 
extra for UK foreign, security and defence 
policy, rather than central or integral. The UK‟s 
position has always been that NATO is the 
principal body for cooperation and 
collaboration on matters of defence, partly also 
driven by the UK‟s desire to maintain close 
links with the US and US interest and 
commitment to Europe. The UK has 
committed personnel to the majority of the 
EU‟s „civilian‟ missions deployed for roles such 
as border observation and capacity building for 
third countries. It has made more modest 
personnel commitments to military operations. 
The civilian missions fit readily into the UK‟s 
development of the „comprehensive approach‟ 
to international conflict management, which 
brings together diplomacy, defence and 
development resources to address the 
problems of failed and failing states.  
 
The CSDP has not been a core component of 
British security and defence planning over the 
last decade. The UK‟s most recent five-yearly 
Strategic Defence and Security Review made 
no reference to the CSDP as a component of 
the UK‟s approach to providing for its national 
security and defence.  The UK‟s major defence 
commitments, including renewal of the Trident 
nuclear weapon and submarine delivery system 
and two Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers 
to be equipped with new F-35B fighter jet 
aircraft have not been made with direct 
reference to military roles that might be 
undertaken by the UK through the EU.  
 
The UK has resisted proposals to deepen 
further the institutionalisation of European 
defence by giving the EU‟s European Defence 
Agency (EDA) a greater role or budget.  
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The UK has also blocked the creation of a 
permanent military EU operational headquarters, 
an idea which is supported by a majority of 
other EU member states including France and 
Germany.  
 
WHAT WOULD BE THE COSTS TO THE 
UK’S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY OF 
A BREXIT? 
 
The effects on the UK of a Brexit might be 
greater on bilateral EU member state foreign 
and security policy relationships rather than with 
the EU per se. One example is the UK‟s 
relationship with the Republic of Ireland, with 
which it shares a common travel area and a 
partnership in the Northern Ireland peace 
process.  
 
The UK has also invested particularly heavily in 
its relationship with France in recent years. The 
2010 Lancaster House Treaties have created a 
new Franco-British defence relationship rooted 
in collaboration on nuclear weapons technology 
and increased interoperability of armed forces. 
The treaties are premised on closer cooperation 
between the UK and France to facilitate greater 
burden-sharing in the EU and NATO. France 
has persisted with the idea of Anglo-French 
coordination at the heart of a successful EU 
foreign, security and defence policy despite the 
reticence of recent British governments in 
respect of an EU defence policy. Were Britain to 
leave the EU, the rationale for closer links 
between the UK and France would diminish, 
and France might turn to other 
intergovernmental partnerships with member 
states such as the Weimar grouping (Poland, 
Germany and France) which offer ready-made 
substitutes for defence collaboration.  
 
The UK would also face a major complication in 
the key transatlantic pillar of its foreign policy 
relationship with the United States. An EU 
departure would be placing the UK in a contrary 
position to that of the United States in recent 
decades, pursued by both Democrat and 
Republican Administrations, to support and 
promote EU and NATO enlargements. Outside 
the EU, the UK would no longer have leverage 
on future enlargements of the EU or seeking 
to ensure that EU defence policies are 
developed in a manner that also strengthens 
NATO. The United States has become more 
interested in seeing the EU develop greater 
conflict management capabilities as a 
complement to NATO‟s contribution to 
European security. With UK no longer in a 
position to drive these arrangements might the 
special relationship no longer be quite so 
special? 
 
Negotiating an exit from the EU itself would 
occupy extensive diplomatic and political 
bandwidth for an extended period which 
would then be unavailable to focus on the 
extensive and pressing set of security 
challenges currently faced by the UK. A key 
priority for British foreign policy for the two 
years following a Brexit vote would be to 
negotiate the UK‟s relationship with the EU as 
provided for under Article 50 of the Treaty on 
European Union.  
 
The effects of Brexit on the EU‟s foreign and 
security policy would not be one-sided. The 
loss of one of the EU‟s “big 3” member states 
would raise questions about the EU‟s capacity 
to weather the future, coming on the heels of 
the Eurozone and migration crises. Less 
dramatically, the UK‟s voice as a key 
participant in the EU‟s collective foreign policy 
would be lost. And the UK‟s national foreign 
and security policy will still remain intertwined 
with the policies, preoccupations and crises of 
the EU and its remaining member states. The 
UK will need to reconsider how it organises 
key landmarks in its bilateral relationships with 
key European countries such as France and 
Germany as it would be outside the work and 
meetings of the European Council and the 
Foreign Affairs Council. 
 
A UK outside the EU would be a key subject 
of the EU‟s foreign security and defence 
policies. As a country with a significant track 
record in international engagement, and a 
range of diplomatic, military, development and 
other foreign policy resources, the EU would 
seek the UK‟s support for its foreign policy 
initiatives. The EU would want to see the UK 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
 5 
  
associated with it main foreign, security and 
defence policy activities. In turn, the UK would 
want to maintain influence on the EU‟s policies. 
This interrelationship would be best served by a 
mechanism that would allow for the UK to 
remain closely associated with the EU in the 
foreign, security and defence policy area. 
Existing arrangements that allow for non-
member states to participate with the EU in this 
area (such as Norway) would need to be 
reimagined to incorporate the UK. And perhaps 
best arranged on a Treaty basis between the UK 
and the EU‟s member states.  
 
The question of the impact of a Brexit on the 
UK‟s foreign, security and defence policy 
relationship with the EU needs to be set against 
the backdrop of a broader discussion of the 
UK‟s international role. The UK has already 
faced recent unfavourable commentary on 
waning influence due to the effects of austerity 
on its diplomacy and defence capabilities.6 The 
relatively under-developed and 
intergovernmental nature of the EU‟s foreign, 
security and defence policies means that the 
impact of a Brexit would have a minimal direct 
effect on UK national foreign and security 
policy. However, exiting the EU, especially 
against a backdrop of urging a decision to 
remain by the UK‟s key international partners 
such as the United States, would create a high 
degree of uncertainty as to the UK‟s future 
international role.  
 
Professor Richard G. Whitman is Senior 
Research Fellow with The UK in a 
Changing Europe programme, Visiting 
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the University of Kent. 
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Endnotes 
1It was a notable component of his remarks at the World Economic Forum in Davos on 21st January. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/davos-2016-prime-ministers-speech-to-the-world-
economic-forum 
2 IMF, 2014, after the US, China, Japan, and Germany. 
3 SIPRI, 2015, after the US, China Russia, Saudi Arabia and France. 
4 SIPRI, 2015. 
5As the European Council on Foreign Relations annual EU Foreign Policy Scorecard illustrates 
http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard/2015 
6 The UK‟s defence budget has been cut in real terms by 19% and the foreign affairs budget by 16% 
(Chatham House, 2015).   
  
  
 
